Hume’s taste for standards.

Experience and aesthetic judgement reconsidered by Gatti, Andrea
In this analysis I will attempt to verify the value of Hume’s aesthetics
concentrating primarily on the problem of aesthetic judgement. The topic is
as much as ever the subject of inquiry in all its various forms, contradictions,
implications and verifications; nor is there a paucity of investigations on
investigations, or critical studies on critical studies. My aim, however, is not
to seek an explanation capable of breaking the chain of the theoretical, philo-
logical or metaphysical questions relating to any particular aspect of Humean
aesthetics. On the contrary, I intend to lengthen that chain, and rather than
attempt to simplify the complexities of the specific points of inquiry concern-
ing Hume’s taste, which seem to me to remain unresolved to this day, my pur-
pose is to stratify them. And rather than interpreting any particular theme or
aspect of Hume’s Standard of Taste (1759), I will proceed to examine some of
the general questions elicited by his essay. My purpose is to demonstrate how
an interesting lesson on aesthetic judgement in general can be drawn not only
from the Humean rule of taste, but also from the exceptions that can be
found to challenge it; and how our effort to resolve the problem raised by
such exceptions can be assisted not so much, and for once, by Hume’s analy-
sis of the concept of taste but by his implicit hints on the subject of standard.
1.  In his essay on taste Hume reiterated the main points – and system-
atized the specific outcomes – of a long series of reflections which, since the
early part of the century, first in England and later in Europe, established aes-
thetics as a philosophical discipline well before Baumgarten ratified its theo-
retical status in 1735. All in all, the aesthetic writings of the early eighteenth
century in England produced a homogeneous body of thought in terms of
problematical assumptions and methodological options; and when Hume
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stated in The Standard of Taste (1759)1 that he wished to “mingle some light of
the understanding with the feelings of sentiment” (p. 139), he was not really
moving so far from the aspiration that had spurred the efforts of the philoso-
phers who had come before him. 
These philosophers – from Shaftesbury to Addison and from Hutcheson
to Berkeley – pursued the following common goals: 1) to identify the facul-
ties that govern judgement of beauty, and to determine their functions and
possible relations; 2) to fight relativism in aesthetic appreciation; 3) and, con-
sequent upon the previous point, to bring that appreciation back within the
confines of a rational logos or, where this is considered impracticable, at least
within the equally intellectual realm of a systematic gnoseology which lays
the foundations of the “sentimental” nature of taste.
Shaftesbury, who was the first to address all three issues, not only made
a clear distinction between the faculties responsible for aesthetic judgement
but also set them in hierarchical order, separating the sense of the beautiful
from taste or relish. He identified the former as the universal and innate (or,
by his own definition, connatural) foundation of the aesthetic experience, and
viewed it as an immediately reactive faculty not dissimilar, in perceptological
terms, from all the other senses, to the extent that they cannot escape from
the solicitations to which they are subjected: “No sooner the Eye opens upon
Figures, the Ear to Sounds, then straight the Beautiful results, and Grace and
Harmony are known and acknowledg’d”2.
To Shaftesbury however, and subsequently to Hume, entrusting aesthet-
ic judgement to sense was tantamount to attributing normative value to indi-
1 All quotations from Hume’s Standard of Taste, followed by the relevant page, are taken from
the following edition: Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. and with a Foreword, Notes, and Glossary
by E.F. Miller, with an apparatus of variant readings from the 1889 edition by T.H. Green & T.H. Grose,
Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 1987, pp. 226-249 (nr. XXIII. Of the Standard of Taste). A large number of
publications can be found concerning Hume’s aesthetics: I only mention the ones more specifically con-
cerned with the problem of taste: C.W. KORSMEYER, Hume and the Foundation of Taste, “Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 35, 1976, pp. 201-215; P. KIVY, Hume’s Neighbor’s Wife: An Essay on the
Evolution of Hume’s Aesthetics, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 23, 1983, pp. 195-208; M. MOTHERSILL,
Hume and the Paradox of Taste, in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, ed. by G. Dickie et al., New York, 
St. Martin’s Press, 19892, pp. 269-286; D. TOWNSEND, Hume’s Aesthetic Theory. Taste and Sentiment,
London & New York, Routledge, 2001, pp. 47-85 (2. Taste) (pp. 221-225); J. LEVINSON, Hume’s Standard
of Taste, “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 60, 2002, pp. 227-238, which gave way to a discussion
between J.S. WIEAND, Hume’s Real Problem, ibid., 61, 2003, pp. 395-398, and Levinson himself, The Real
Problem Sustained: Reply to Wieand, ibid., pp. 398-399; C. WILLIAMS, Hume on the Tedium of Reading
Spenser, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 46, 2006, pp. 1-16; B. RIBEIRO, Hume’s Standard of Taste and the
de gustibus sceptic, ibid., 47, 2007, pp. 16-28.
2 The Moralists III 2 (1709), in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1713), ed. by
P. Ayres, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999, II, pp. 1-124: p. 111. On the distinction between aesthetic sense
and taste see A. GATTI, «Il gentile Platone d’Europa». Quattro saggi su Lord Shaftesbury, Udine,
Campanotto Ed., 2000, pp. 25-46 (II. Sul problema del giudizio estetico in Shaftesbury). On Shaftesbury
and Hume: Townsend, Hume’s Aesthetic Theory, pp. 12-46 (I. Shaftesbury and Hume) (pp. 218-221).
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vidual pleasure (or whim, one is tempted to say), thereby producing evalua-
tive teratologies which he – a passionate and enthusiastic expert of the clas-
sics, and a demanding virtuoso and connoisseur of literary and figurative arts –
would never have allowed himself to endorse. Shaftesbury recognized that
while sense can elicit an immediate aesthetic pleasure, judgement of beauty
may not be sudden in all cases, and frequently requires more sophisticated
and reliable deciphering tools, a more careful scrutiny, and a more detailed
evaluation, which transcend personal reactions to aesthetic solicitations3.
Hence his view of Taste, in the strict sense of the word, as a noetic faculty that
is not innate but acquired through deliberate effort and choice, and capable
of subjecting the aesthetic worth (or pretensions) of an artwork to analytical
scrutiny4.
How long e’er a true Taste is gain’d! How many things shocking, how many offen-
sive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledg’d the highest Beautys! For ’tis
not instantly we acquire the Sense by which these Beautys are discoverable. Labour
and Pains are requir’d, and Time to cultivate a natural Genius, ever so apt or for-
ward. But who is there once thinks of cultivating this Soil, or of improving any
Sense or Faculty which Nature may have given of this Kind?
As can be seen from the quotation above, in eighteenth-century English
aesthetics, the relationship between sensibility and intellectual mediation in
aesthetic judgement was regarded as a problem right from the outset.
Obviously, Hume too regarded this as a crucial issue and it seems to me eas-
ier to agree with his answers to these questions than with those put forward
by the authors who came between these two philosophers. They, in fact, gave
an enthusiastic response to Shaftesbury’s idea, and set it within an empiricist-
metaphysical framework fairly rigorous in its intentions, but not always real-
izing the urgency of those problems, and not without misunderstandings.
Indeed, they frequently neglected the aspect which Shaftesbury was most
concerned about, namely the rationalist aspect, which Hume, by contrast,
was very much aware of. 
Addison and Hutcheson in particular, for instance, shifted the focus on
sentiment. Hutcheson talked about an internal sense as “a passive power of
receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is uniformity amidst
variety”5, and explained the variety of tastes by putting forward a type of argu-
3 The Moralists III 2, p. 116: “If BRUTES therefore, [...] be incapable of knowing and enjoying
Beauty, as being Brutes and having SENSE only (the brutish part) for their own share; it follows, ‘That
neither can MAN by the same Sense or brutish part, conceive or enjoy Beauty; But all the Beauty and Good
he enjoys, is in a noble way, and by the help of what is noblest, his MIND and REASON’”.
4 Ivi, p. 105.
5 F. HUTCHESON, An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design VI 10 (1725), ed. by 
P. Kivy, The Hague, M. Njhoff, 1973, p. 80. On Hutcheson’s aesthetics: C.W. KORSMEYER, Relativism
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ment based on associationist principles. “The Association of Ideas”, he wrote,
“is one great cause of the apparent diversity of fancys in the sense of beauty,
as well as in the external senses”6. In his view, moreover, beauty always gives
rise to a disinterested pleasure that is therefore disconnected with any ration-
al evaluation of utility, end, and so on7.
This is exactly the opposite of what Berkeley claimed. To him, beauty is
a rational judgement grounded in functionalist considerations. It is odd that
the philosopher of solipsism did not dwell on taste as a subjective faculty, and
that, shifting his focus to a decidedly eccentric perspective, he supplied an
objective (and tetragonal) definition of beauty which he conceived as conven-
ience, i.e. the attainment of an end. His example is renown and I will quote
it briefly. Taking issue with Renaissance canons which identified beauty with
order, proportion and symmetry, Berkeley denied that those qualities were
exhaustive of the characteristics of the beautiful; and to support this view he
used an example as witty as that of Sancho’s hogshead (which, for once, if 
I may, I will not go into)8 related by Hume. According to architects, said
Berkeley, the basic requirement for a door to be beautiful is that its height
should be twice as long as its width. If, however, we were to position the door
horizontally rather than vertically, argued the philosopher, we would observe
that the required proportions would remain identical; far from being beauti-
ful, however, the door would become ridiculous, precisely because propor-
tions do not necessarily guarantee the beauty of something if they run coun-
ter to its proper functions and its proper purposes9.
and Hutcheson’s Aesthetic Theory, “Journal of the History of Ideas”, 36, 1975, pp. 319-330; C. KORSMEYER,
The Two Beauties: A Perspective on Hutcheson’s Aesthetics, “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 38,
1979, pp. 145-151; D. PAXMAN, Aesthetics as Epistemology, Or Knowledge Without Certainty, “Eighteenth-
Century Studies”, 26, 1992-1993, pp. 285-306; E. MICHAEL, Francis Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception and
Aesthetics Pleasure, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 24, 1984, pp. 241-255; P.J.E. KAIL, Function and
Normativity in Hutcheson’s Aesthetic Epistemology, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 40, 2000, pp. 441-451;
P. KIVY, The Seventh Sense: a Study of Francis Hutcheson’s Aesthetics and Its Influence in Eighteenth-Century
Britain, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 20032. On Addison, see A. GATTI, «Et in Britannia Plato». Studi sul-
l’estetica del platonismo inglese, Bologna, Clueb, 2001, pp. 17-61 (1. Intelletto e Idea nei Pleasures of the
Imagination di Joseph Addison), with bibliogr., to which one should add G. SERTOLI, Presentazione, 
in J. ADDISON, I piaceri dell’Immaginazione, trad. it. di G. Miglietta, a cura di G. Sertoli, Palermo,
Aesthetica, 2002, pp. 7-19; see also Appendice biobibliografica, ibid., pp. 87-92; C. DE WITT THORPE,
Addison and Hutcheson on the Imagination, “Journal of English Literary History”, 2, 1935, pp. 215-234.
6 HUTCHESON, Inquiry VI 11, p. 80.
7 “This superior power of perception is justly called a sense because of its affinity to the other
senses in this, that the pleasure does not arise from any knowledge of principles, proportions, causes, or
of the usefulness of the object, but strikes us at first with the idea of beauty” (ibid. I 12, p. 36).
8 On the aesthetic implications of the anecdote of Sancho’s hogshead (p. 234f.), see G. CARA-
BELLI, Intorno a Hume, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1992, pp. 4-43 (La botte di Sancho).
9 See G. BERKELEY, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), ed. by D. Berman, London &
New York, Routledge, 1993, p. 67f. On Berkeley’s Aesthetics, see B. MARCIANO, George Berkeley. Estetica
e idealismo, Genova, Nova Scripta, 2010, pp. 135-209 (III. L’estetica di Berkeley), with updated bibliogr.
(pp. 211-224).
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The argument is obviously captious since it not the proportions that
remain identical in that position but the measurements, and the height of the
door will now be half its width, actually going against the architectural rules
of the Renaissance. At least, however, Berkeley should be credited for having
brought to the fore a utilitarian conception of the beautiful, modelled on a
Socratic approach, which was later taken up by Hume in his fifth require-
ment of taste, i.e. intelligence of the end and of the purpose. Most important-
ly, Berkeley called attention, perhaps even too forcefully, to the rights of the
intellect in aesthetic judgement, ascribing to the intellect alone a conclusive
action on aesthetic matters. The beauty, therefore, or symmetry of an object,
he argued, “cannot be apprehended but by knowing its use, and comparing
its figure with that use: which cannot be done by the eye alone, but it is the
effect of judgement”10.
2.  As we can see, the aesthetics of the early eighteenth century raised
quite a few questions: I apologize for my ungenerous simplification of doc-
trines that are actually much more structured and complex, but I thought it
necessary to elucidate the problematical background – at least on the points
that are instrumental to my investigation – against which Hume’s aesthetics
can be seen to have taken shape.
And within that background, a crucial problem immediately transpires:
how, exactly, are we to understand the relationship established by Hume
between the “great variety of taste” and the presumed uniformity of human
nature? A number of preliminary specifications on terminology are helpful in
this respect. By sentiment (“The sentiments of men often differ with regard to
beauty and deformity of all kind”, p. 227) I mean the principal subjective
token of the sudden occurrence of an aesthetic solicitation, whether positive
or negative. By taste I mean the acquired normative character of that senti-
ment, which in this case becomes a reliable token of the objective beauty of a
work of art: “...though the principles of taste be universal”, writes Hume,
“and nearly, if not entirely, the same in all men; yet few are qualified to give
judgement on any artwork, or establish their own sentiment as the standard
of beauty” (p. 144). And the purpose of his essay is to ascertain how that
acquisition comes about; namely to investigate the ways in which Sentiment
can aspire to the status of Taste.
As is well-known, the analysis leads Hume to enunciate the five neces-
sary requisites11 for that shift to occur; of these, the first uses essentially
10 BERKELEY, Alciphron, p. 67.
11 On the “five requisites”, see: R.A. SHINER, Hume and the Causal Theory of Taste, “Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 54, 1996, pp. 237-249; S. ROSS, Humean Critics: Real or Ideal?, “British
Journal of Aesthetics”, 48, 2008, pp. 20-28; with a reply by P. GUYER, Humean Critics, Imaginative
Fluency, and Emotional Responsiveness: a Follow-Up to Stephanie Ross, ibid., pp. 445-456.
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innatist argumentations and refers to “the original structure of the internal
fabric” (p. 138) and to the delicacy (of imagination, or taste, as he calls it on
different occasions), given in nature but subject to perfecting.
Such perfecting can be accomplished through the two subsequent, more
empirical, requisites: namely, experience or “practice in a particular art, and the
frequent survey or contemplation of a particular species of beauty” (p. 141),
and comparison between aesthetic qualities.
These two requisites are definitely more rationalistic in character and
coincide with the suppression of prejudice by good sense or reason – which,
“if not an essential part of taste”, is nevertheless “at least requisite to the oper-
ations of this latter faculty” (p. 143) – and with the recognition of the end pur-
sued by an artistic creation: “Every work of art has also a certain end or pur-
pose, for which it is calculated; and is to be deemed more or less perfect, as it
is more or less fitted to attain this end” (ibid.).
Subdivided into nature, experience and intellect, the five Humean requi-
sites summarize doctrines which, as I recalled earlier, had already been enun-
ciated in the decades before his time, specifically by Hutcheson, Shaftesbury
and Berkeley. The interesting point for our purposes, however, is that to
Hume, the full and perfect possession of the five requisites ratifies the shift
from individual sentiment to normative taste, and thus defines the standard
of taste. By contrast, the want or lack of one or all of these requisites confines
that sentiment to the realm of pure subjectivity. 
However, an explanation addressing the variety of tastes should be able
to support a more extensive range of cases than just comparisons between two
(or more) individuals differently endowed with the five aesthetic requisites,
i.e. a simple comparison between dilettanti and professional critics.
It should explain, for example, the difference in appreciation between
individuals equally endowed with those requisites, namely between judges that
are equally expert and whose delicacy of taste, experiential background, impar-
tiality and understanding of ends are beyond doubt. Furthermore, it should
provide not only explanations of inter-personal differences but of intra-per-
sonal ones as well, i.e. transformations of taste occurring within the same indi-
vidual, who may, for example, be currently indifferent to something which he
appreciated enormously until a short time earlier, or vice versa. This kind 
of transformation should not be considered in terms of chronological discon-
tinuities such as would justify change or treat change as inevitable: obviously
almost no-one at fifteen can appreciate Joyce with the same degree of aware-
ness or critical maturity as he would display at thirty-five. Such a transforma-
tion should be regarded as genuinely problematical, i.e. as occurring over a
delimited timespan entirely subsequent to the point when an individual
acquired the five requisites, namely starting from a certain level of develop-
ment in his aesthetic education. The explanation should also account for vari-
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ations in causes even when the effects remain the same; in the sense that, for
example, the reasons why a literary critic appreciates a novel or a poem today
may be different from those that made him appreciate them six months ago.
In my opinion, Hume’s essay can indeed provide an answer to all these
questions. I also believe, however, that this answer can be grasped more effec-
tively – since it is not explicitly stated – by applying the Ockham’s razor to
the five Humean requisites, and selecting the two requisites that comply most
closely with the empiricist dictate, namely those concerning experience and
comparison. I will thus expand the meaning of these two requisites following
the indications supplied elsewhere by Hume himself, in this as well as in his
other works. While Hume does not exactly provide an explicit and direct
explanation, he – first and foremost, and better than anyone else in eigh-
teenth-century England – offers exceptionally useful tools for advancing a
possible hypothesis.
To Hume, the legitimacy of taste itself rests on the foundations of a
broad aesthetic-artistic knowledge (either experience or practice): those who
have seen, analysed and compared a greater number of masterpieces have a
wider and more sophisticated knowledge to understand and interpret; but,
most importantly, they have more parameters or models of excellence to be
able to compare and evaluate. In a word, they possess a standard, against
which to measure every new artistic production or experience of taste. I think
the concept of “standard” in Hume becomes very interesting if we take it in
its literal sense, meaning a canon rather than a rule, even if this means strain-
ing Hume’s text: that is, if we understand it as a parameter of evaluation or a
scale of values to which we can refer and on which we can measure – by way
of comparison – the quality of every new aesthetic production12: 
It is impossible to continue in the practice of contemplating any order of beauty,
without being frequently obliged to form comparisons between the several species
and degrees of excellence, and estimating their proportion to each other. A man,
who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of beauty, is indeed
totally unqualified to pronounce an opinion with regard to any object presented to
him. By comparison alone we fix the epithets of praise or blame, and learn how to
assign the due degree of each [...]. One accustomed to see, and examine, and weigh
the several performances, admired in different ages and nations, can only rate the
merits of a work exhibited to his view, and assign its proper rank among the pro-
ductions of genius.
12 For a different perspective of Hume’s standard as an aesthetic category, see: P. KIVY, Hume’s
Standard: Breaking the Circle, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 7, 1967, pp. 57-66; with a reply by 
N. CARROL, Hume’s Standard of Taste, “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 43, 1984, pp. 181-194; 
P. JONES, Hume’s Aesthetics Reassessed, “Philosophical Quarterly”, 26, 1976, 102, pp. 48-62; J.R. SHELLEY,
Hume and the Nature of Taste, “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 56, 1998, pp. 29-38; TOWNSEND,
Hume’s Aesthetic Theory, pp. 180-216 (6. The Problem of a Standard of Taste) (p. 233ff.).
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Standard seems to be exactly this: a sort of grading scale within which
taste assigns to each artwork “its proper rank”. Experience first (which creates
and sets the standard) and comparison afterwards (which allocates an artwork
to a ranking position x within that standard), are the processes that determine
the shift from sentiment to taste, namely the shift from an individual reac-
tion to an objective judgement, from an “obscure and confused” pleasure to
a “clear and distinct” evaluation (p. 237): since, obviously, the more multiples
and sub-multiples (of judgement) we include on the scale, the more precise
and reliable the measurement will be.
Furthermore, taste is so dependent on standard that it can only be con-
noted as normative if and only if a standard exists, otherwise it remains senti-
ment. In Kantian terms, standard is the causa essendi of taste; and taste is the
causa cognoscendi of standard. 
However, while the second requisite allows a general understanding of
the notion of taste as an organic concept – which comes into being, grows,
changes, improves, and deteriorates – it still does not explain the variety of
tastes displayed by different judges, all of whom have a standard and are
therefore able to make comparisons.
In practice, the presumed “great variety of tastes” reduces itself to four
variants, divided into two classes, depending on whether the person judging
is an amateur, a dilettante, or an expert. Looking at a contemporary, abstract
painting, for example, the amateur may not understand the meaning of what
looks to him like an absurd creation, nor feel any pleasure while contemplat-
ing it; alternatively, he can still feel some pleasure – a purely visual one,
aroused by the colours or the pictorial effort, the novelty of the eccentric rep-
resentation, and so on – even without understanding how these works can
command millions of dollars at auctions or be exhibited in museums. In both
cases, the amateur necessarily lacks the understanding made possible by aes-
thetic experience alone; hence his sentiment, if it is there at all, cannot aspire
to the status of taste.
By contrast, the other class of judges to which expert critics belong, def-
initely have understanding but may be wanting in sentiment. This gives rise
to the other two variants, since approval of an artwork is one thing, but appre-
ciation of it is something different. By the former I mean a neutral recogni-
tion of the objective value of an artistic production, what Hume calls “the dis-
cernment of beauty”, or “survey of merits and defects” (p. 237); by the latter
I mean approval combined with the transport of admiration, or, in Humean
terms, with a sentiment of “approbation or displeasure” (p. 141), since it is not
unusual to recognise the value of a poem or a painting, even if they don’t
arouse our intimate appreciation. We can recognise the value of an author, yet
decide that he will never be the author of our life.
Hume is therefore right in insisting on sentiment, since this is what 
– under these terms and conditions – seems to mark the distinction between
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aesthetic judgement and formal judgement. In his essay, Hume does not offer
an apology for sentiment, but for the right sentiment, which is something dif-
ferent and is ratified by cognitive premises, and this is where Hume’s argu-
ment makes a breakthrough; in the absence of understanding, sentiment
remains lawless, it has no universal value and provides no judgement. 
When I talk about approval without transport, however, I am expressing
myself in empirical terms (such as “the unthinking and the unphilosophical
part of mankind”)13, without any logical rigour. After all, when I acknowledge
that something “is beautiful”, it is because somehow it has already struck a
chord with me, albeit not strongly enough to arouse my transport. 
It seems, then, that in this case too, the intensity of the sentiment accom-
panying aesthetic perception is in turn evaluated according to a standard, and
ranges from the minimum required to determine approval through to higher
levels that elicit appreciation (set initially by nature, according to the first req-
uisite, and later by experience). And in order to accept Hume’s lesson one is
forced to admit to the existence not only of an external standard, connected
with the aesthetic quality of the production, but also of an internal standard,
connected with the intensity of sentiments. Sentiment is always at the root of
aesthetic approval, but it is only from a certain degree upward that an act of
approval (where a sentiment of pleasure is the minimum requisite for an act
of intellectual recognition) becomes appreciation (where intellectual compre-
hension is the minimum requisite for a legitimate aesthetic pleasure). Equally,
it is a comparison between a current fact and a permanent standard that caus-
es appreciation, resulting from a comparison between the intensity of the
impression elicited by this particular artwork with the intensity of previous
impressions we have experienced, whether positive or negative.
So let us look at the standard of sentiment, which is what causes the shift
from approval to appreciation, since it is at this level that we can see a more
clear-cut justification of the variety of tastes. In order to explain it, I have to
reconsider the relationship between experience and judgement based on
Hume’s treatment of the second requisite14. 
As we said earlier, a theory on the rule of taste should account for a wide
range of exceptions, so numerous in fact as to raise doubts about the possibil-
ity of ratifying that rule. I would actually argue that experience or aesthetic
practice in itself allows only a partial defence of Hume’s theory.
Let us take the case of two critics with equal expertise: if what makes the
difference between them cannot be knowledge deriving from aesthetic experi-
ence, since it is common to both of them, what makes the difference must be
13 A Treatise of Human Nature I 4, 2 (1739-40), ed., with an Introd. by E.C. Mossner, London,
Penguin Books, 1984, p. 255.
14 On sentiment in Hume, see T.A. GRACYCK, Rethinking Hume’s Standard of Taste, “Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 52, 1994, pp. 169-182.
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the sentiment which we have just been talking about. Indeed, two critics can
agree on the beauty of two poems, but not on the superior beauty of one
poem vis-à-vis the other. The difference, therefore, does not lie in their
approval, on which they mutually agree, but in their intimate appreciation.
It really does seem, therefore, that the great variety of sentiments accom-
panying expert evaluation is what determines the variety of tastes. If we want
to dissect the problem down to its roots, however, the crucial question
becomes: what determines the great variety of sentiments (from which the
variety of tastes depends)? Well, just as the latter is determined by aesthetic
experience, the variety of sentiments is determined by experience sic et sim-
pliciter, meant in its overall, existential, sense.
Aesthetic experience can determine approval, but it is experience in gen-
eral (existential) which determines appreciation, or the onset of that senti-
ment which, on the underpinning of cognitive approval, gives rise to Taste.
It is as if we were hearing echoes of Hutcheson’s associationism15 (which,
however, totally lacks any aesthetic-experiential underpinnings). I would
recall, however, that even before Hutcheson, Descartes had already expound-
ed the same theory in the few lines he wrote in a letter to Father Mersenne
showing a remarkable insight. When questioned as to the variety of taste,
Descartes provided the following explanation: play a dancing tune to a dog
for a certain amount of time while you are beating it. From that point on, the
same notes that bring happiness to a woman, reminding her of dances, suit-
ors and youthful loves, will fill the unfortunate dog with terror and send him
running off whimpering as far away as possible16.
3.  The concept of experience, understood in terms of its general value
and in direct relation to sentiment (which, through approval, gives rise to
judgement), finally seems to provide an explanation to the different cases of
variety of taste.
What can explain different tastes displayed by equally expert judges is
not approval determined by aesthetic experience, but appreciation deter-
mined by experience tout court; in the same way as we can explain why, in
terms of experience, I appreciate today what I was unmoved by yesterday; and
why I can approve of the same artwork for entirely different reasons a year
later. The experience of certain emotions or sentiments – such as love, aban-
15 See M. KALLICH, The Associationist Criticism of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, “Studies
in Philology”, 43, 1946, pp. 644-667. On the influence of Hutcheson’s aesthetics on Hume, see: 
W.A. HALBERSTADT, A Problem in Hume’s Aesthetics, “Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, 30, 1971,
pp. 209-214.
16 Letter by Descartes to Mersenne, in Œuvres, ed. by. C. Adam & P. Tannery, I. Correspondance
Avril 162 2 -Février 163 8, Paris, Libr. Philos. J. Vrin, 1974, pp. 128-135 (nr. XX: «18 mars 1630»): pp. 133.27-134.11.
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don, guilt, crime, failure, success, and so on – is the tool that enables us to
appreciate (and not simply approve of ) the way they are portrayed, and to be
struck or moved if the portrayal reflects truthfully the effects of these emo-
tions and sentiments and evokes their intensity (“just expression of passion”,
p. 145). Our tastes are not impermeable to the changes in our lives: this we
can acknowledge even without reading Hume, who, for his part, convenient-
ly warns of how time and experience influence the alternating prevalence and
intensity of passions:
A young man, whose passions are warm, will be more sensibly touched with amo-
rous and tender images, than a man more advanced in years, who takes pleasure in
wise, philosophical reflections concerning the conduct of life and moderation of the
passions. At twenty, Ovid may be the favourite author; Horace at forty; and perhaps
Tacitus at fifty. Vainly would we, in such cases, endeavour to enter into the senti-
ments of others, and divest ourselves of those propensities, which are natural to us.
[...] it is almost impossible not to feel a predilection for that which suits our parti-
cular turn and disposition. Such preferences are innocent and unavoidable, and can
never reasonably be the object of dispute, because there is no standard, by which
they can be decided (p. 244).
Things are even more complicated than this – does not taste, in turn,
influence experience? Here Hume seems to connect sentimental reaction to
the “interior fabric”, to something given and unchangeable (humour, temper,
turn, disposition); but his very examples actually speak of dispositions and
humours which change, and this can only occur as a result of the experiences
we accumulate, and which gradually shape and change our character (tem-
per). Experience creates a standard that determines our preferences, but the
opposite does not hold true: “there is no standard by which they [scil. our
preferences] can be decided” (p. 244). 
4.  A final, though no less crucial, aspect is the following: if the investi-
gations of taste we have conducted so far correctly account for diversity of
taste, then they must be capable of being applied to the borderline case,
where taste is considered not from a passive but from an active standpoint;
and not as receptive but as creative as well. 
This is because the choices made by the artist are ultimately choices of
taste. And the art forms that elicit the viewer’s reactions of taste are in turn
determined by the taste of their creator. A composition may be the result of
chance, as in the case of a pianist who, moving his hands on the keyboard
without calculation may involuntarily play a wonderful sequence of chords
and create a marvellous harmony; or an image that may flash suddenly and
involuntarily through the mind of the artist. Whether the image will end up
on canvas, however, and whether it will do so exactly in the way it first pre-
sented itself or with a few subsequent adjustments, will be determined by the
artist’s taste. The artist, no less than the critic, exercises control over his cre-
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ations through his own taste. And while his greatness can be measured
according to his imaginative genius or the expertise of his execution, there can
surely be nothing more disheartening than a sublime hand at the service of a
very poor taste.
So, in what way does experience in general (more than aesthetic-artistic
experience), and the sentiment it produces, engage or influence creative taste
– without reducing sentiment to the much-abused and hollow concept of
“inspiration”, if possible? Hume, too, in his search for the underpinnings of
the rules of composition seems in this case to seek to go beyond the more
restrictive confines of artistic experience and turn his attention to human
experience17: 
It is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasonings a priori,
or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the understanding [...]. Their foundation
is the same with that of all the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing
but general observations, concerning what has been universally found to please in
all countries and in all ages. [...] though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it
must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author either by genius or obser-
vation (p. 231).
“Genius” and “observation” is a very prudent hendiadys and we might
expect Hume to take a stand on either one or the other of these clearly irrec-
oncilable things. The real problem, however, is different: what has struck the
human mind as beautiful, always and everywhere, “in all countries and in all
ages” (a sort of collective standard), does not always guide the standard of
taste of the artist, who frequently does his utmost to go against or beyond, or
change standards and canons.
I have already had the opportunity to draw attention to this aporia else-
where18: if we assume that aesthetic-artistic experience alone is responsible for
taste, then, strictly speaking, the taste of the artist cannot be innovative, since
for his creations to be appreciated, his taste has to conform to a well-estab-
lished canon or standard. 
In this sense, the concept of existential experience and standard of senti-
ment is possibly more versatile. The aesthetic experience, in fact, only partly
accounts for creative taste: the artist relies on it to avoid copying or repeating
other works, for example, and, to be sure, will always bear the aesthetic stan-
dard in mind, if for no other reason than to determine the base line below
which he cannot go if his new production, however anti-conformist, will still
be considered good art. Above the base line, however, there are no limits and
17 On the theoretical relationship between taste and rules of art in Hume, see J. WIEAND, Hume’s
Two Standards of Taste, “Philosophical Quarterly”, 34, 1984, 135, pp. 129-142.
18 A. GATTI, Le oscillazioni del gusto. Teoria e prassi del giudizio estetico in età moderna, “I castel-
li di Yale”, X, 2009, pp. 75-90.
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all is left to the artist’s free will, and most of all to his talent. What is the rule
to be, then, where there is still no rule? As soon as the artist strays from the
standard to give vent to his individual originality or creativity, he will no
longer have any certainties; he will only be able to rely on the personal taste
of the beautiful – and this is true by exclusion – that is waiting to become
normative taste, to become a “rule of art”, based on what time and the sedi-
mentation of experience will dictate.
Not to mention the fact that, frequently, it is life’s experience, yet again,
that suggests the artist’s contents. In other words, experience gives rise to ideas,
and artistic experience guides the translation of those ideas into forms. Very
Crocean, but not too far removed from the Humean lesson, since it applies
to the aesthetic sphere one of Hume’s fundamental metaphysical dictates. In
A Treatise of Human Nature II 3, 3 (1739-40), Hume argued that reason can
“never produce any action, or give rise to volition”, which are constantly
inspired by instinctive impulses and natural inclinations. The passage is
renown: “Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”19. 
Although I may have departed somewhat from the Humean lesson, I have
nevertheless been true to the purposes of my investigation, having declared
from the outset that I wished to reflect on the standard of taste not as dealt
with by Hume but setting out from Hume, while attempting to throw some
light on a number of aesthetic questions based on his indications. I hope this
will nevertheless sound like a tribute to, and an acknowledgement of, an
extraordinary teacher whose lesson has contributed to the definition of the
forma mentis of generations of philosophers. This was indeed my intention.
19 A Treatise of Human Nature II 3, 3, p. 462.
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